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ARTICLE 
ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ALL: 
INFORMED CONSENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
ABSTRACT 
The concept of informed consent is well established in the 
field of bioethics, but its application is unclear in the 
area of public health. The increasing prevalence of public 
health interventions creates a need to analyze the scope of 
government power as it relates to individual choice. This 
Article explores three different types of public health measures 
in which individual choice has been limited: (1) environmental 
interventions; (2) classic public health interventions to prevent 
contagious disease; and (3) public health information reporting 
or use. The reasons for limiting informed consent vary 
depending on the context, and the implications for the scope of 
an exception likewise vary. Careful consideration of the 
theoretical bases for exceptions indicates the importance of 
information disclosure in almost all situations, and may lead 
to novel solutions, such as a "fair use" model for health 
information. A singular "public health exception" concept is 
overly broad and superficial. Instead, there should be a fuller 
debate about the requirements of informed consent in the wide 
variety of public health settings. 
Professor of Law, Professor of Bioethics and Professor of Public Health, Case 
Westem Reserve University Schools of Law and Medicine. B.A., 1990, Comell University; 
J.D. 1994, Comell University; MPH 2009, Case Westem Reserve University School of 
Medicine. I would like to thank workshop participants at Case Westem Reserve 
University and the University of Pittsburgh, and specifically Thomas Cunningham, 
George Dent, and Sharona Hoffinan for helpful comments on earlier drafts. In addition, 
Gabrielle LaHatte deserves recognition for her excellent research assistance. All errors 
and omissions are, of course, my own. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Could you be vaccinated against HlNl influenza without 
your consent? Do residents of a municipality need to consent to 
the chlorination of their drinking water? Should public health 
authorities have access to your personal medical information 
without your permission? 
Informed consent is a bedrock principle of bioethics, but its 
application in the context of public health is unclear. In some 
descriptions of the doctrine, the category of "public health" is 
considered a standard exception to informed consent 
requirements. In others, only "public health emergencies" are 
exempted, similar to the general emergency exception.1 Some 
reject the blanket exception altogether and insist that cases be 
evaluated individually, with public health needs balanced 
against individual autonomy.2 Little theoretical work has been 
1. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 35-36 (1986). 
2. See James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare Bemheim, Beyond the Liberal and 
Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV. 
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done in this area to understand the scope of state public health 
powers, and what has been done often applies concepts such as 
"social contract" in a relatively superficial manner.3 Given the 
vast expansion of public health interventions in recent decades, 
there is a growing call for an analysis of individual choice in this 
context.4 
Part I of this Article begins with a brief overview of informed 
consent in health care and lays out the standard exceptions. This 
section examines why we have informed consent for treatment 
and the justifications for allowing exceptions. The standard 
exceptions to informed consent for treatment flow from the initial 
justification for the doctrine's application. Informed consent is a 
means of acknowledging individual autonomy; in situations in 
which autonomy is impaired, or autonomy is not promoted by 
requiring individual consent, exceptions are appropriate. The 
focus is exclusively on adults throughout this Article, and I do 
not address either the application of informed consent doctrine to 
minors or the range of public health interventions that involve 
children.5 Additionally, discussion is limited to public health 
practice and treatment, not research. 6 
Parts II through IV explore three general categories of 
public health practices: environmental health interventions, 
classic public health interventions to combat contagious 
disease, and public health information reporting or use. These 
sections consider the scope of individual informed consent in 
various public health settings. In some cases individual 
consent is inapplicable for reasons similar to the standard 
1191, 1197 (2003). 
3. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ 
Taking, Racial Profiling & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 88-90 (2001) 
(discussing the social contract in the context of presumed consent to public health 
measures). 
4. See Roz D. LASKER & THE COMM. ON MED. & PUB. HEALTH, MEDICINE & PUBLIC 
HEALTH 9, 20 (1997) (discussing the formation and expansion of government agencies 
geared toward addressing "categorical problems" in public health, such as "immunization, 
lead toxicity, sexually transmitted diseases, and tuberculosis"). 
5. There is an extensive literature on consent and children. See, e.g., Yoram 
Unguru, Pediatric Decision-Making: Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Child 
Assent, in CLINICAL ETHICS IN PEDIATRICS 1, 2 (Douglas 8. Diekema et al. eds., 2011). 
6. There is some debate about the line between public health treatment and public 
health research. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC), 
DISTINGUISHING PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH NONRESEARCH 1-2 (July 
29, 2010) [hereinafter CDC Guidelines], http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/integrity/docs/cdc-
policy-distinguishing-public-health-research-nonresearch.pdf ("Although some public 
health activities can unambiguously be classified as either research or non-research, for 
other activities the classification is more difficult."). For my purposes, I will assume that 
the interventions discussed here are considered treatment. 
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exceptions-i.e., based on the analysis of autonomy. In other 
cases the original rationale for requiring informed consent 
(promoting autonomy) clearly applies, but there may be 
various justifications offered to limit its use in the specific 
public health situation. Drawing from political philosophy, 7 I 
explore these justifications for limiting individual choice and 
identify the implications for the application of informed 
consent requirements. Different philosophical theories may 
explain why certain public health interventions are allowed 
without individual consent or explain why interventions are 
allowed in limited circumstances, but none justify a blanket 
exception to informed consent for all actions. The goal of this 
Article is not to resolve debates about the usefulness of various 
theoretical rationales, nor to identify one rationale that 
applies in all circumstances. Rather, it is to show that there 
are different reasons why individual informed consent may be 
avoided in different public health contexts; there is no single 
"public health exception." 
For each category of public health practice, I consider 
whether there needs to be a substitute for, or a modification of, 
legal consent requirements. Some important, perhaps even 
surprising, points come out of this analysis. First, each rationale 
for avoiding individual informed consent has different 
implications for the application of the scope of an exception. 
Nonetheless, all share one thing in common: while one aspect of 
informed consent may be deemed unnecessary (individual 
consent or authorization), the other part is still required 
(information disclosure). Second, the theoretical rationales for 
allowing an exception to informed consent may be different for 
different applications of the same public health intervention. For 
example, vaccination of health care workers without consent may 
be justified using a theory that does not justify nonconsensual 
vaccination of the general public. 8 Furthermore, the rationale 
itself may provide crucial limitations on the extent of the 
exception. If the rationale for allowing the exception is utilitarian 
7. Others have also drawn from political philosophy in evaluating public health, 
although not in the way I do here. See, e.g., Childress & Bernheim, supra. note 2, at 1192 
("Political philosophy ... provides an important foundation for and sets limits on public 
health law. It identifies the normative values that should structure the relationship 
between the state and the individual, the legal powers that enable officials ... to address 
public health threats, and the processes of reflection, deliberation, and justification that 
should direct the exercise of the legal powers." (footnote omitted)); Onora O'Neill, 
Informed Consent and Public Health, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON 
1133, 1133 (2004) (''The most basic philosophical difficulties with informed consent arise 
because consent is a propositional attitude."). 
8. See infra Part liLA. 
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(i.e., public health maximization), it may turn out that a better 
public health result is achieved by instituting a voluntary 
system, which includes consent, rather than by imposing 
mandatory requirements. For example, broader vaccination may 
be achieved through a consent-based intervention, even though 
an exception would appear to be permissible. 
Finally, a shift away from focusing on individual 
authorization requirements in various public health contexts 
allows us to explore novel approaches to thorny problems. There 
is extensive current debate about the sharing and use of an 
individual's private medical information and the role of consent 
in this context. I suggest a type of "fair use" model of information 
sharing, drawing from intellectual property law.9 The end result 
of the work done here will be a better understanding of the scope 
of state public health powers and a fuller debate about the 
specific requirements for individual informed consent in public 
health settings. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
A doctrine judicially created in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, informed consent has become a standard part of medical 
practice.10 It is an interesting question whether the judicial 
doctrine drove the ethical one, or vice versa. Prior to development 
of the judicial doctrine, consent played little or no role in 
standard medical practice. 11 Unlike, for example, the doctrine of 
confidentiality that has a long history in medicine, informed 
consent did not show up in ethical codes until late in the 
twentieth century. 12 Informed consent for research developed 
separately from informed consent for medical practice, and its 
current structure is based on federal regulations.13 Regardless of 
its origins, informed consent now forms the bedrock of clinical 
bioethics. It is not, however, without its critics.14 While the 
principle of autonomy drives much bioethics discourse, many 
commentators have pointed out the need to balance autonomy 
against other interests and to incorporate other ethical 
approaches besides the principlist one upon which the doctrine of 
9. See infra Part IV (discussing public health information reporting and use). 
10. For more detail, see JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL 
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 15, 41, 44-46 (2d ed. 2001). 
11. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 86-87. 
12. Id. at 84-86. A full analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this piece. 
13. BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 249. 
14. See generally id. at 146-61 (focusing on three critiques: autonomy-oriented, 
health-oriented, and interactionist). 
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informed consent appears to be based. 15 Autonomy is a Western 
(and distinctly American) value and may not fit well within other 
cultures and practices. 16 Even under a principlist approach to 
bioethical issues in medicine, 17 the principle of autonomy may 
sometimes be outweighed by the principle of justice, which can 
limit the distribution of scarce medical resources regardless of 
individual preferences, or by the principle of beneficence, which 
may weigh in favor of treatment even over the individual's 
objections. 18 But even with these concerns, autonomy remains a 
strong concept within bioethics and medicine, and it is most often 
actualized through the doctrine of informed consent. 19 
Informed consent, while often referred to as a unitary 
concept, is really made up of two requirements-a duty to 
disclose information and a right to make decisions. 20 To meet the 
information requirement, physicians must disclose basic 
information about the patient's diagnosis and treatment options 
along with their risks, benefits, and alternatives. 21 The patient is 
asked to either consent to or refuse the treatment. (In this sense, 
"informed choice" may be a better name for the doctrine than 
"informed consent" because refusals must also be informed.)22 The 
vast literature and extensive case law on informed consent will 
not be rehashed here.23 More relevant for our purposes are the 
specific situations in which either or both requirements 
(disclosure and consent) are altered or avoided. The established 
exceptions include: incompetence,24 waiver,25 emergencies,26 
15. ld. at 32-34; see, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 33 
(1998) (recognizing the force of autonomy in bioethics, but arguing that it should be one of 
a "bouquet of concepts" that are considered with regards to medical decisions). 
16. BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 14. 
17. A principlist approach identifies a series of core principles that should guide 
medical practice. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAiviP & JAiviES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 12-13, 25 (6th ed. 2009). According to the version proposed by 
Beauchamp and Childress, the principles include: autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
and justice. I d. at 12-1.3. In many applications of the principlist approach, the principle of 
autonomy seems paramount. Cara M. Cheyette, Comnwnitarianism and the Ethics of 
Communicable Disease: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 678, 682 
(2011). 
18. 
19. 
FADEN & BEAUCHAlviP, supra note 1, at 12-18. 
Id. at 18-19. 
20. BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 41. 
21. Id. at 54-60. 
22. Id. at 54. 
23. See generally id. at 41-52 (chronicling the development of consent requirements 
by the courts). 
24. Jessica Wilen Berg, Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Constructing 
Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Malle Medical Decisions, 48 
RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 346-47 (1996). 
25. Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiuer, 40 Hous. L. REV. 281, 326-29 
f 
•) 
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therapeutic privilege,27 and some public health interventions-
the scope ofwhich are the focus of this Article. 
A. Justification for the Doctrine of Informed Consent 
w-hy require individual informed consent? A number of 
reasons are offered by consent theorists. 28 First, individuals 
are most likely to know their interests and thus make better 
choices for their health and well-being.29 Second, the 
information requirement may increase the likelihood that the 
intervention will be beneficial because the individual better 
understands what to expect, including being prepared to 
recognize problems that may arise. 30 Third, even if individuals 
err in their choices, we are better off as a society if we 
encourage individual decisionmaking and thus develop 
autonomous citizens.31 Fourth, individuals have a right to 
control what happens to their bodies.32 
The first three of these rationales are straightforwardly 
utilitarian-more utility overall comes from allowing individual 
choice, even if in a particular situation one could argue that the 
individual is making a poor decision. While overall we may be a 
better society if we encourage individual decisionmaking, this 
may not be true in all cases. Act-utilitarianism would allow 
variations of the rules to be determined on a case-by-case basis, 
and it is an unwieldy theory to apply. 33 Rule-utilitarianism seeks 
to identify the general rule that would increase utility and is a 
more common approach.34 Here the general rule is thought to 
(2003). 
26. BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 76. 
27. Id. at 79. 
28. See id. at 18-21 ("The primary goals of informed consent are the protection of 
patient or subject welfare and the promotion of autonomy."); see also FADEN & 
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 7-16 (including also the principle of justice, but noting that 
"[t]he major moral and conceptual problems about informed consent are not justice-based 
and do not directly confront issues of social justice"). 
29. BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 20, 24. 
30. See id. at 18 (disGussing benefits that derive from informed consent, such as 
monitoring of symptoms). 
31. See Berg, Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 24, at 346 (opining that it is preferable to 
allow an individual to make his or her own choices even if another person is better able to 
make the decision); Charles W. Lidz & Robert Arnold, Rethinking Autonomy in Long Term 
Care, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 603, 605 (1993) (discussing the reasons that autonomous 
decisionrnaking is superior to outsider decisionrnaking in the health care context). 
32. BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 21. 
33. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 17, at 339-40. 
34. Id.; see also David 0. Brink, Mill's Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
1669, 1671 (2010) ("[T]he most common indirect utilitarian theory of duty is rule 
utilitarianism."). 
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favor individual choice. But even a general rule will have 
exceptions, and rule-utilitarianism allows for these when the rule 
with the exception would result in more overall utility than the 
rule applied without exception. (In essence, the rule is either 
defined more narrowly to exclude the exception, or the exception 
is built into the rule.)35 Take the example of quarantine-a 
situation in which allowing individual choice may result in 
significant societal harms. An act-utilitarian would ask, for 
example, whether the quarantine of this particular person would 
increase overall utility. A rule-utilitarian would ask whether a 
rule permitting the quarantine of any person who finds herself in 
the particular situation would increase overall utility (regardless 
of the utility balance in a particular case). Both approaches 
would theoretically allow for quarantine without individual 
consent, provided the balance of utility worked in its favor.36 
The final rationale for requiring individual informed consent 
is rights based and closely linked to the development of the 
judicial doctrine.37 But as with other rights-based justifications, it 
does not necessarily provide a sufficient rationale on its own.38 
Where does the right come from? Or to put it another way, why is 
there a right to control what happens to one's body? Appeal to a 
natural rights framework may solve the problem for some.39 
Individuals have inherent rights over their bodies, and informed 
consent simply recognizes those rights. But even if we accept a 
natural rights basis, individual rights of bodily integrity are not 
absolute, and there will be situations in which harm to the group 
may overcome individual authority to control what happens to 
oneself. From another perspective, individuals have rights, such 
as the right to control what happens to their bodies, because it 
increases overall utility (by, for example, encouraging autonomy, 
or because individuals are better suited to make decisions about 
themselves than others). Thus, rights theory may not stand on its 
own in this context; rather, the "rights" that arise are those that 
35. J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART & 
BERNARD WILLIAiVIS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 10-11 (1973). 
36. I'll return to this in more detail below when discussing quarantines. See infra 
Part III (discussing quarantine as a classic public health intervention). 
37. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 40-41 (discussing how some 
decisions regarding medical treatment are protected by the constitutional right to 
privacy). 
38. See BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 21-22 (stating that the right to determine 
what happens to one's own body does not by itself justify informed consent). 
39. The source of such natural rights raises other questions. For a full discussion of 
a rights-based right to informed consent (albeit in the research context), see generally 
CHARLES FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 
(1974). 
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serve a utilitarian basis. If the rights are based on utilitarian 
reasoning (e.g., according the rights results in a better society 
overall than when not doing so), there is always an argument 
that in certain contexts the overall utility favors overriding the 
right in question. 
B. Informed Consent Exceptions 
The commonly recognized exceptions to informed consent 
flow from the justifications. For the therapeutic exception, if the 
provision of information would so impair autonomy-by making 
it impossible for the individual to make a decision-then the 
detrimental information may be withheld. 40 Incompetent 
individuals lack autonomy, so providing them information or 
asking them for a decision would not promote autonomy.41 Waiver 
is itself an exercise of autonomy; it constitutes a choice either to 
limit disclosure of certain information or not to make a decision 
at all. 42 In an emergency, limited time makes the full provision of 
information and sometimes decisionmaking impossible-
autonomy is not promoted by allowing irreparable harm to occur 
due to strict enforcement of consent requirements.43 
What about the public health exception? First, it is worth 
spending a moment considering what is meant by "public health" 
in this context. There are many definitions of "public health." 
According to the Institute of Medicine's (IOM) report The Future 
of Public Health, "Public health is what we, as a society, do 
collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy[,]"44 a 
definition that seems to include everything from homelessness 
prevention to vaccination to primary care to gun control. Others 
try to distinguish between individual medical care and 
40. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The scope of this 
exception is extremely limited, and it is hard to conceive of a situation in which the 
information would be so damaging. !d. 
41. There is a range of incapacities, and the determination oflegal incompetence to 
make medical decisions may vary according to the situation. For additional discussion on 
this point, see Berg, Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 24, at 345-51; and O'Neill, supra 
note 7, at 1133, noting that informed consent is not possible for "numerous patients with 
various types of incapacity." 
42. Berg, supra note 25, at 326-29, 332. I develop the idea of waiver in great detail 
elsewhere and will not repeat it here. See generally id. at 306-14, 319. 
43. See BERGET AL., supra note 10, at 76-77 ("If a patient's condition is such that 
the time necessary for disclosure and consent would be so great that health or life would 
be seriously jeopardized ... , none of the interests promoted by the informed consent 
doctrine are served."). 
44. COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE 
FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988). 
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population health care. 45 Still others focus on the authority of the 
state to use legal coercion. 46 We need not resolve this debate. The 
limits of "public health" for purposes of a physician's obligation to 
promote the health of the community may be different from our 
understanding of "public health" for purposes of an 
epidemiologist's research agenda. 47 Because we are focused here 
on a public health rationale for limiting individual autonomous 
decisionmaking, at issue are those public health interventions 
which raise questions about the authority of the state to use legal 
coerciOn. 
In the following sections, I consider some examples of such 
public health interventions in order to understand whether 
informed consent should play a role. I have divided the 
discussion of public health interventions into three general 
categories: environmental health activities, classic public 
health interventions used to combat contagious diseases, and 
use of an individual's medical information for population 
health purposes (such as determining population disease 
burden). These provide a snapshot of the range of public health 
interventions that raise concerns about the use of state power 
without individual consent, and each highlights a different 
underlying rationale. Environmental health activities are 
examples of situations in which the initial justification for 
applying the doctrine of informed consent (autonomy) may not 
be pertinent. Contagious disease prevention activities provide 
examples in which the doctrine would likely apply but there 
are strong reasons to limit the requirement of individual 
45. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 16 (2d ed. 2008) ("Public 
health is organized to provide an aggregate benefit to ... all the people in a given 
community .... Public health differs from medicine, which has the individual patient as 
its primary focus."); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Autonomy and Coercion in Disease and Health 
Promotion, 5 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 83, 85-86 (1984) (noting that personal 
autonomy is treated differently in curative medicine, which is for the benefit of individual 
patients, than in preventative medicine, which is for the good of the whole population). 
46. For example, Professor Mark Rothstein explores a taxonomy of public health 
and divides the approaches into three categories: human rights, population health, and 
governmental intervention. Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, 
30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 144, 144-149 (2002), reprinted in PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS 71-76 
(Ronald Bayer et al. eds., 2007). Rothstein supports the narrow definition of public health 
as legal intervention. Id. at 76. Edmund Pellegrino focuses on the moral use of coercion to 
seek the community's overall health, which is a socially desirable end. Pellegrino, supra 
note 45, at 86-89. 
47. See Rothstein, supra note 46, at 72 (suggesting that "public health" for purposes 
of research questions is less complex than the social and political issues that need to be 
resolved for medical interventions); CDC Guidelines, supra note 6, at 2-3 ("The purpose of 
research is to generate or contribute to generalizable knowledge. The purpose of 
nonresearch in public health is to prevent or control disease or injury and improve health, 
or to improve a public health program or service."). 
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authorization. Finally, use of an individual's medical 
information is a mixed category in which the initial 
justifications for application of the doctrine and the range 
justifications for overriding it should lead to development of 
novel approaches. Not only may the discussion below clarify 
the scope of the public health exception, it may also be helpful 
in identifying what alternative protective measures should be 
applied to substitute for the lack of individual informed 
consent. 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS 
Environmental health activities have been around for as long 
as civilization and provide a good place to begin a discussion of the 
role (or lack thereoD of individual informed consent. "Sanitary 
measures and the protection of food and water supplies 
characterized virtually all of the early civilizations" and were used 
in ancient Egyptian, Greek, and Roman cities.48 One of the most 
common environmental interventions, even today, is the regulation 
of water supplies. Few people suggest that individual informed 
consent should play a role here or in similar environmental health 
activities (such as regulation of air quality). Why not? 
First, and most importantly, environmental interventions 
are not applied directly to a particular individual, but at the 
community level. 49 Public health interventions that are not 
applied at the individual level raise fewer autonomy concerns, 
weakening the initial rationales for requiring informed consent.50 
It is unclear whether the individual has special expertise for 
making community-level decisions, even with the provision of 
additional information. Thus, while we might think that each 
individual is best able to make the choice whether or not to 
undergo surgery, there is less reason to believe that each 
individual separately is best able to make the choice whether to 
48. JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH 5-6 
(1990). 
49. When an environmental intervention moves to an individual application model, 
there is usually an effort to obtain consent. For example, while most co=unities 
fluoridate their water supply directly, some provide fluoride tablets to schoolchildren after 
obtaining parental permission. For an example of a parental permission form, see 
Fluoride Tablet Permission Form, SARANAC LAKE CENT. SCH., http://saranaclakecs.org/ 
education/components/docrngr/default. php?sectiondetailid=3897 & Clast visited Sept. 7, 
2012). 
50. See Spencer A. Hall, Should Public Health Respect Autonomy?, 18 J. MED. 
ETHICS 197, 197-99 (1992) (noting that "[t]here is no clear precedent for 'community 
autonon1y"'). 
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set certain clean air or water standards.51 The result may be that 
some corollary of informed consent is necessary at the group 
level. 
Second, even though there may be individual effects from 
environmental public health interventions, there may be 
important reasons to limit individual choice. In fact, allowing 
such choice may fundamentally undermine the benefits for others 
in the society, perhaps resulting in less individual autonomy 
overall. The absence of basic environmental health standards can 
prevent individuals from exercising even their most fundamental 
rights of bodily integrity. For example, someone living in a 
community without basic environmental health protections, such 
as a clean water supply, may not be able to exercise much 
autonomy (or even survive until adulthood). 52 
In thinking about these types of community-level decisions, 
consider the "tragedy of the commons" described by ecologist 
Garrett Hardin.53 The concept of"the commons" refers to property 
or goods \AJhich are 110n-exclt1dable (one indi~lidual ca11not prevent 
the use by another individual) and rivalrous (the use by one 
person may prevent the use by others). 54 As a result, each 
individual may use up vast amounts of the resource, thus 
destroying its use for everyone. The so-called "tragedy of the 
commons" occurs when the economically rational (over)use by one 
51. This is not to say that the individual might not vote, as part of a group, 
regarding the clean air standard. But it is less clear that we would have to accord each 
individual the right to consent to or refuse clean air in the same way we may do so for a 
surgery. 
52. See, e.g., The Need, WATERAIDAiviERICA, http://www.wateraidamerica.org/ 
what_we_do/the_need/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (noting that "[c]lean water 
is essential for life"). The theoretical rationale underlying such arguments is a 
communitarian one. In one basic form, communitarian theory posits that individuals are 
fundamentally social beings and that there is no liberty right to take any action that 
would undermine the bonds that hold society together because it would undermine society 
and thus wreak havoc with individual identity. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Comnwnitarian 
Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308, 308-311 (1985) (remarking that 
communitarians disagree with the liberal idea that individual rights should be prioritized 
over societal rights). Similarly, other non-individualistic theories, such as feminist 
theories or theories of care, stress that obligations arise due to the bonds of care and 
affection between individuals and that the state should use its power to reinforce and 
support those bonds. Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
ETHICAL THEORY 537, 542, 549 (David Copp ed., 2006). Individual choices, which 
undermine those bonds (by causing harm to the group as a whole), may be limited. 
Liberty under this approach is a positive freedom-individuals may be restricted from 
certain actions that would make them less free. Communitarian theory can thus provide a 
basis for understanding limitations on individual autonomy, including limitations on 
individual informed consent for public health interventions. 
53. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy oftlre Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
54. Jose Apesteguia & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, The Role of Rivalry: Public Goods 
Versus Common-Pool Resources, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 646, 64 7 (2006). 
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person destroys the good for all. 55 Hardin's example was of 
overgrazing cattle on common lands. 56 If all people are allowed to 
act according to their own individual interests, the commons will 
not survive.57 Public goods, by contrast, are those that are both 
non-excludable (there is no way effectively to prevent someone 
from using the good) and non-rivalrous (the use by one person 
does not limit the use by another). 58 For public goods, there are 
concerns about free riders who will not "pay" for the good in 
question.59 If there are enough free riders, the good may be 
negated. 60 National defense is a paradigm example of a public 
good, and water and sanitation are paradigm examples of 
commons. In both public good and commons cases, society (via 
government) has an important role to play in setting parameters 
to address the flaws in individual decisionmaking and to 
accommodate for group interests. While a model of "community 
input and consultation" may be appropriate, assuming it could be 
applied in practice, it is less clear what role individual choice 
should play. Unlike the traditional medical context, requiring 
individual consent in the context of commons and public goods 
may result in less overall autonomy because the good will not 
continue to be available.61 As a result, most environmental health 
interventions do not use an individual informed consent model. 
But even if there is little role for individual consent here, the 
information disclosure aspect of the informed consent doctrine 
should be maintained. There is nothing in the analysis of 
commons or public goods that would support limiting information 
disclosure. In fact, the information disclosure remains crucial to 
protect autonomy.62 For example, municipalities routinely supply 
information about local water quality and the protective 
measures applied to their public water supplies. 63 To the extent 
55. Hardin, supra note 53, at 1244. 
56. Id. 
57. See id. ("Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all."). 
58. Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: 
Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 
1373 (2006). 
59. ld. at 1370. 
60. See Hardin, supra note 53, at 1244-45 (explaining that everyone is "locked into 
a system of 'fouling our own nest,' so long as [they] behave only as independent, rational, 
free-enterprisers"). 
61. See id. at 1245 (remarking that "the oceans of the world continue to suffer from 
the survival of the philosophy of the commons" and warning that "we must soon cease to 
treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone"). 
62. See GOSTIN, supra note 45, at 411 (reasoning that information is traditionally a 
component of informed consent, which is based off of "personal autonomy and self-
determination"). 
63. See, e.g., CITY OF Hous. DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS & ENG'G, CITY OF HOUSTON, 
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individual choice is allowed, the individual has the burden to opt 
out by taking other measures (e.g., by seeking another water 
supply, such as a private well or bottled water), rather than by 
restricting the chlorination on a case-by-case basis. Information 
disclosure is necessary to exercise such individual choice. 
Moreover, while there may be little role for individual 
consent, this is a good example of a context in which a group 
input may be appropriate. There are a variety of suggestions as 
to how to deal with group interests in decisionmaking. One idea, 
discussed extensively in the human subjects research literature, 
is to engage in a type of "community consultation" in order to 
gain community input into the decisionmaking process.64 The 
community consultation process is not a substitute for individual 
informed consent; rather, it is a mechanism through which to 
involve the community in the development, review, and oversight 
of a research trial. 65 The consultation may be achieved through 
various means, and there is continuing debate about how best to 
achieve community involvement. Suggestions include identifying 
community spokespersons or leaders, holding special community 
meetings, surveying relevant groups, and implementing public 
notification mechanisms.66 For example, UNAIDS, the United 
Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, publishes Good Participatory 
Practice Guidelines for HIV prevention trials. These guidelines 
lay out a detailed community engagement plan, which includes 
DRINKING WATER QUALITY REPORT 2006 1-5, 
http://documents. publicworks.houstontx.gov/documents/divisions/utilities/water _quality _r 
eport_2006.pdf (informing the public of the sources of drinking water and the quality of 
drinking water). 
64. See, e.g., Jessica Berg, Waiver of Informed Consent for Emergency Research, 1 J. 
MED. & L. 1, 19, 26-27 (1997) (discussing the community consultation requirement for 
emergency research). There are also suggestions to use community consultation for 
international research and for U.S. research involving vulnerable populations (such as 
genetics research). See, e.g., Charles Weijer & GuyJ. LeBlanc, The Balm of Gilead: Is the 
Provision. of Treatment to Those Who Seroconvert in HN Prevention Trials a lV!atter of 
Moral Obligation or Moral Negotiation?, 34 J.L. lVIED. & ETHICS 793, 805 (2006) 
(describing U.S. and international guidelines for community consultation in research). 
65. See Patricia A. Marshall & Jessica W. Berg, Protecting Communities in 
Biomedical Research, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 29 (2006) (noting that "community approval 
does not replace the need for individual consent[,]" and discussing various ways that 
communities can be consulted throughout the period community research projects are 
conducted). 
66. Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498, 
51,514-15 (Oct. 2, 1996); CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. AWARDS CONSORTIUM CIVITY. 
ENGAGEMENT KEY FUNCTION CO!VIM. TASK FORCE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CIVITY. 
ENGAGEMENT, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRINCIPLES OF COIVIMUNITY 
ENGAGEMENT 115-16 (2d. ed. 2011) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY 
ENGAGEMENT]; GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., THE GENETIC TOWN HALL: MAKING EVERY 
VorcE COUNT 1-3 (2004); Marshall & Berg, supra note 65, at 29. 
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education, capacity building, and community empowerment.67 In 
fact, the concept of community engagement is becoming more 
prevalent in public health practice generally.68 The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) stress the need to 
"broaden our understanding of the key principles that underlie 
successful community engagement in public health."69 The June 
2011 second edition of Principles of Community Engagement 
provides a review of the concepts and principles, as well as a 
detailed plan for engaging communities in public health practice 
and research. 70 There are also frameworks for community input 
in the area of environmental law, requiring community referenda 
before allowing certain types of land development.71 Another 
example comes from the Convention of Biological Diversity, 
which requires "[p]rior informed consent" from indigenous 
communities for access to genetic resources.72 
All community consultation approaches have similar 
limitations, such as difficulties identifying the relevant 
"community" (there are often multiple, overlapping communities) 
and related problems identifying relevant spokespersons.73 But 
despite these limitations, each approach provides an important 
recognition of the group interests at stake. While community 
input should not be thought of merely as an extension of 
individual informed consent, it can serve a similar role-
providing a check against government intervention in situations 
67. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), GOOD 
PARTICIPATORY PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL HN PREVENTION TRIALS 31-32 
(2007), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/unaids/2007/9789291736348_eng.pdf. 
68. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, supra note 66, at xv, 3; 
Mary Anne Morgan & Jennifer Lifshay, Community Engagement in Public Health, 
CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVS. 2 (2006), http://www.barhii.org/resources/downloads/ 
community_engagement.pdf (describing Contra Costa Health Services' community 
engagement efforts). 
69. CDC/ATSDR COMM. ON CMTY. ENGAGEMENT, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 1 (1997). 
70. See generally PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, supra note 66 (outlining 
concepts, principles, and a detailed plan for community engagement). 
71. Brant McGee, The Community Referendum: Participatory Democracy and the 
Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent to Development, 27 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 570, 
568, 592 (2009); see also Melanie Nakagawa, Comment, Overview of Prior Informed 
Consent from an International Perspective, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL 'y 4, 4, 6 (2004) 
(raising the issue of who should give consent in multilateral environmental agreements by 
explaining examples ofland use conflicts in Chile and Alaska). 
72. Joshua Rosenthal, Politics, Culture, and Governance in the Development of Prior 
Informed Consent and Negotiated Agreements with Indigenous Communities, in 
BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW 373, 374 (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007); Laurel A. Firestone, 
Comment, You Say Yes, I Say No: Defining Community Prior Informed Consent Under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 171, 176 (2003). 
73. Marshall & Berg, supra note 65, at 29. 
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where individual consent is absent." Although many health 
departments already take steps to alert communities about 
environmental health efforts, more work should be done to 
develop mechanisms of gathering and incorporating community 
input with respect to the various environmental decisions that 
must be made before intervention. In the same way that the 
incompetence exception to traditional informed consent does not 
relieve physicians of their informed consent obligations, but 
simply shifts the disclosure and consent requirements to 
surrogate decisionmakers, in the environmental health context 
public health officials should be viewed as having corresponding 
obligations to inform and consult with affected communities. 
Individual informed consent may not play a significant role in 
environmental health interventions, but community consultation 
should.75 
III. CLASSIC PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS TO COMBAT 
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES 
Protection of the sanitary environment is one classic 
example of public health powers; protection against infectious 
disease (quarantine, isolation, and vaccination) is another.76 I 
refer to these as "classic" examples because they (at least 
quarantine and isolation) have been around since the Middle 
Ages and are often thought of as fundamental public health 
powers. 77 Almost all states, foreign and national, have laws 
74. OFFICE OF GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND SPONSORS: EXCEPTION 
FROM INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RESEARCH 25-26 (2011), 
http://fda.gov/downloads/Regulatoryinformation/Guidances/UCM249673.pdf (providing 
the example of community consultation for emergency situations where individual 
informed consent is not available); Marshall & Berg, supra note 65, at 29-30 
(distinguishing between individual informed consent and community involvement, and 
explaining the confusion that arises when the two forms of protection are aligned). 
75. See McGee, supra note 71, at 571-73 (pointing out that community consultation 
can stop projects). 
76. Quarantine is the separation of individuals who may have been exposed to the 
infectious agent. Quarantine and Isolation, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). Isolation is the 
separation of individuals who are infected. Id. I'll use the terms vaccination and 
immunization interchangeably below. Technically immunization is any process by which 
you achieve a sufficient immune response. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
910 (30th ed. 2003). Immunization can occur after an initial, naturally occurring, 
infection. How Vaccines Worh, NAT'L NETWORK FOR lMIVIUNIZATION INFO., 
http://www.immunizationinfo.org/parents/why-immunize/how-vaccines-work (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2012). Vaccination is one mechanism to achieve immunization by the direct 
introduction of a weakened or inert pathogen that triggers the body's immune response, 
thus protecting against future infection. Id. 
77. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (rejecting the defendant's 
+ 
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granting explicit powers to public health authorities to 
quarantine individuals exposed to dangerous contagious diseases 
or isolate those who are infected to prevent further spread.78 
Mandatory vaccination is more controversial, 79 and in most cases 
is not imposed as an outright requirement, but rather posed as a 
condition for privileges such as public school entry80 or 
employment.81 Even the best known of the U.S. vaccination cases, 
the Supreme Court's 1905 decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
involved a vaccination law that could be avoided if the individual 
paid a fine of $5, moved from the jurisdiction (the requirement 
applied only to residents of Cambridge), or could show some 
health reason for exception.82 
The underlying focus of these public health interventions is 
on protection of public safety by preventing the spread of disease. 
The Jacobson court, for example, stressed that "[u]pon the 
principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community 
has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease 
which threatens the safety of its members."83 But while an 
argument can be made in favor of community self-defense 
against epidemics, unlike the environmental health interventions 
assertion that by imprisoning him for refusing vaccination the state was invading his 
liberty because "[t]here are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily 
subject for the common good"); DUFFY, supra note 48, at 7-8, 24 (explaining the history of 
isolation and quarantine). Vaccination came later, after the development of the smallpox 
vaccination by Dr. Edward Jenner in the late 18th century and the subsequent 
development of immunization by Louis Pasteur in the late 19th century. GOSTIN, supra 
note 45, at 372. Vaccination was preceded by variolation, or the process of direct 
introduction to the live pathogen. D.A. HENDERSON, SMALLPOX: THE DEATH OF A DISEASE 
44 (2009). This was previously used in the smallpox context, most famously by Lady Mary 
Wortley Montegu, the wife of the British Ambassador to Constantinople, in the early 
1700s. Id. at 45. She subsequently convinced the royal family to use it. I d. Cotton Mather 
advocated the technique around the same time in Boston. Id. Unlike vaccination, which 
uses a weakened or inert pathogen, variolation carries the risk that the patient will 
become ill with the disease in question and could spread it to others. Id. at 44--45. Even 
so, the illness and death rate from variolation was significantly below the rates for 
contracting the disease naturally. For example, for smallpox the death rate for variolation 
was approximately 2%, while the death rate for the disease in the population was 30%. Id. 
at 45. 
78. GOSTIN, supra note 45, at 437. 
79. Id. at 376-77. 
80. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: 
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 868-73 (2002). 
81. Healthcare workers are required to have a number of vaccinations. See, e.g., 
Vaccines & Immunizations, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www2a.cdc.gov/nip/statevaccapp/statevaccsapp/Administration.asp?statetmp=TX 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2012). 
82. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12, 38-39. The health exception was read into the statute 
by the Supreme Court, which assumed that any vaccination mandate would have such a 
limitation. Id. 
83. Id. at 27. 
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described above, all three-vaccination, quarantine and 
isolation-are interventions that are applied at the individual 
level. The individual application of the intervention raises the 
same concerns about autonomy that justified application of the 
informed consent doctrine in the first place. Why not simply 
inform individuals and allow individual choice in these contexts? 
The problem is that the individual interests in these situations 
do not always line up with the community interests. While this 
may seem obvious in the case of quarantine and isolation, it is 
also true for vaccination, which may provide some benefit to the 
individual, but may also be harmful. Geoffrey Rose draws 
attention to this problem in his description of the "prevention 
paradox," noting that "a (preventive) measure that brings large 
benefits to the community offers little to each participating 
individual."84 Herd immunity is achieved by vaccinating enough 
members of the population to prevent the spread of illnesses.85 
From the perspective of any one individual, the harms of 
vaccination may outweigh the benefits, especially if there is 
assurance that enough other members of society are vaccinated, 
thus achieving herd immunity for the group.86 These so-called 
"free riders"-people who take advantage of the good in question 
(herd immunity) without "paying" for the good (by being 
immunized themselves)-may undermine the public good 
completely. If enough people assume that others will choose to be 
vaccinated and thus decide not to get vaccinated themselves, the 
end result may be a failure of herd immunity and an increased 
disease burden on the population in question. But while the free 
rider problem provides a good basis for justifying some 
government intervention, it may not be a strong enough 
argument for bypassing individual informed consent for 
vaccination. Unlike the environmental cases described above, 
here the individual is required to take on a direct burden, one 
which may have significant implications for individual health. 
There is great resistance in U.S. society to overriding individual 
autonomy when the issue is one of bodily integrity.87 
Assuming for our purposes that the doctrine of informed 
consent applies to the classic contagious disease interventions, 
are there rationales justifying an exception in these 
circumstances? There are some possibilities alluded to in the 
84. Geoffrey Rose, Strategy of Prevention: Lessons from Cardiovascular Disease, 282 
BRIT. lVIED. J. 1847, 1850 (1981) (emphasis omitted). 
85. GOSTIN, supra note 45, at 378. 
86. Id. 
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Supreme Court's opinion in Jacobson. The Court first appears to 
rely on a social contract rationale. Citing the "fundamental 
principle of the social compact[,)" the Court stressed that it was 
"not prepared to hold that a minority, residing or remaining in 
any city or town ... , and enjoying the general protection 
afforded by an organized local government, may thus defy the 
will of its constituted authorities .... "88 The "contract" here may 
be based on the notion of tacit consent-individuals who chose to 
remain in the jurisdiction requiring vaccination are thought to 
have agreed to the vaccination. In fact, the Jacobson case itself 
took pains to stress that the smallpox vaccination requirement 
applied only to residents of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and 
noted that the "safety of an entire population [cannot be) 
subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses to 
remain a part of that population."89 In addition to the tacit 
consent idea, the Court stated that the majority of the population 
understands vaccination to be an appropriate mechanism to 
prevent smallpox, indicating, perhaps, that hypothetical consent 
would function in this context. 90 An alternative basis for the 
contract appears to be fairness, as the Court refers to the 
possibility that a minority should not be allowed to put at risk 
the health of the majority. 91 Should we understand these 
theoretical social contract arguments to provide a practical basis 
for intervening without individual informed consent, or even 
against the individual's express wishes? 
A. Social Contract 
In fact, the most commonly cited rationale for exerc1smg 
state power even over individual objection in the public health 
context relies on social contract theory, although it is rarely 
examined in detail. 92 The social contract idea rests on the notion 
that by choosing to live in a society we each agree to accept 
certain obligations.93 Although an individual may not have 
88. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27, 37. 
89. Id. at 27-28, 38. The Court also noted that Jacobson, "while remaining in the 
community, refused to obey the statute ... . "I d. at 39. 
90. I d. at 34-35. 
91. Id. at 37-38. 
92. See, e.g., Pellegrino, supra note 45, at 86-88 (discussing the use of the social 
contract theory in improving the health of the community). 
93. See id. at 87-88 ("[A]n obligation of a good society [is] to provide some measure 
of health for its citizens, and a duty of a good citizen [is] to contribute to the health of 
society."); see also JONATHAN WOLFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 42 
(rev. 2006) ("[B]y quietly enjoying the protection of the state one is giving it one's tacit 
consent."-!. 
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consented to a particular intervention at the time of its 
application, we can posit her prior consent as part of a social 
contract. John Locke noted that the concept of consent is 
extremely limited in this context. 94 Express consent is very rare, 
although it would most easily justify state power over 
individuals-few people expressly consent to live in a society and 
to the corresponding state power. 95 
1. Tacit Consent. Instead of explicit consent, we might rely 
on tacit or implied consent based on the individual's acquiescence 
to governmental rule and his acceptance of the benefits of society. 
This poses problems. If consent is the basis for justifying the 
state's powers, it seems odd that mere tacit acceptance of the 
social arrangement could bind an individual. 96 Surely more is 
needed to justify state power, particularly where the individual 
in question, such as Jacobson, is objecting. Hume argues that 
mere residence in a jurisdiction is not enough for tacit consent, 
because the only way to "dissent" would be to leave the country.97 
Rousseau goes further to emphasize that absent true freedom to 
leave at will, which he argues rarely if ever exists, the concept of 
tacit consent cannot justify state power. 98 Consider the use of 
HIV asylums in Cuba to isolate infected individuals99 -one would 
be hard pressed to argue that those people who are confined 
"consented" to the confinement merely based on their continued 
residence in Cuba. 
94. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 291 (1821) (describing the 
"perfect member" of society as one who expressly consents, but noting that tacit consent is 
more common and complex); see also PETER JOSEPHSON, THE GREAT ART OF GOVERNMENT: 
LOCKE'S USE OF CONSENT 1-2 (2002) ("Jolm Locke is lmown as the great modern 
proponent of the idea that a government must be established or founded on the consent of 
the governed if it is to make any claim to legitimacy."). 
95. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 94, at 148-49 ("Many may be subject to the law; 
only a few are full, participatory members."). 
96. There is an extensive debate about the role of express versus tacit consent, 
including the role it plays in Locke's philosophy. See id. at 149-56 (discussing critiques of 
Locke's tacit consent theory and Locke's deliberate concealment of the distinction between 
explicit and tacit consent). Resolving the issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
97. WOLFF, supra note 93, at 43. 
98. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 110 (Roger D. Masters ed., 
Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762) (asserting that the only context 
in which inhabiting a territory is sufficient "to submit oneself to sovereignty'' is a "free 
State, because elsewhere an inhabitant can be kept in the country against his will by 
family, goods, the lack of a place of refuge, necessity, or violence; and then his sojourn 
alone no longer presupposes his consent to the contract or to the violation of the 
contract"). 
99. Helena Hansen & Nora Groce, Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Quarantine 
in Cuba, 290 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2875, 2875 (2003). 
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While the tacit consent idea may not suffice to bind an 
individual resident, it may well suffice for the mandatory 
vaccination of certain groups, although even this is not without 
controversy. For example, one might argue that the choice to 
enter the medical profession, or perhaps a particular professional 
specialty, functions as tacit consent for public health 
interventions such as vaccination. The concept of a "social 
contract" between professionals and society is based on the idea 
that society accords professionals certain benefits, in exchange 
for certain obligations.100 But even if tacit consent (by entering 
and remaining in the profession) functions in this context to 
create obligations, one must still establish that mandatory 
vaccination is one of those obligations.101 Recently there was great 
resistance to efforts to enforce mandatory H1N1 vaccinations of 
health care workers in New York state.102 In part, the resistance 
to the mandatory vaccination laws has been on utilitarian 
grounds; noncompulsory schemes coupled with education are 
better accepted and may result in greater rates of vaccination 
among the target population.103 Mandatory vaccination is also 
used for military personnel104-another context in which tacit 
consent may function through the decision to enlist in one of the 
armed services. But even if tacit consent justifies mandatory 
vaccination, there would be little basis for avoiding information 
disclosure, only for avoiding consent. Moreover, there are various 
safety and efficacy requirements that must be met before 
implementing a mandatory vaccination program m the 
"l"t 105 m11 ary. 
100. Allen E. Buchanan, Is There a Medical Profession in the House?, in CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH, 105, 109, 113-14, (Roy G. Spece, Jr. et 
al. eds., 1996). 
101. See Olga Anikeeva et al., Requiring Influenza Vaccination for Health Care 
Worhers, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 24, 24-26 (2009) (discussing the implications of imposing 
a requirement of mandatory influenza vaccinations on health care workers). 
102. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Karen Zraick, New Yorh Health Care Worhers Resist 
Flu Vaccine Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at A18. 
103. Anikeeva et al., supra note 101, at 27. 
104. VACCINE HEALTHCARE CTRS. NETWORI\, STRATEGIC PLAN 18 (2010), 
http://vhcinfo.org/documents/VHCStratPlan W ebResolution. pdf. 
105. John D. Grabenstein et al., Immunization to Protect the US Armed Forces: 
Heritage, Current Practice, and Prospects, 28 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 1, 16-17 (2006). There 
has been quite a bit of debate about the use of a mandatory anthrax vaccination in the 
military, based on concerns that its safety and efficacy have not been established (nor, 
possibly, the extent of the risk of exposure to anthrax). I d. at 14-15. Whether or not the 
mandatory anthrax vaccination is appropriate, the lack of information provided to 
members of the armed services during the vaccination effort raises additional concerns 
because there appears to be no basis for waiving the disclosure requirement, only the 
consent requirement. 
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2. Hypothetical Consent. If express and tacit consent are 
limited, hypothetical consent might be an alternative basis for 
grounding the social contract. Here, one would hypothesize that 
if an individual actually were given a choice, she would agree to 
be bound by the state in certain ways. The actualization of a 
hypothetical consent model is more complex than simply 
assuming the individual would agree to a particular law or state 
intervention. Such an assumption could not itself be binding. 106 
Hobbes would argue that the hypothetical consent arises out of a 
determination that certain societal constraints are necessary for 
societal functioning and are mutually beneficial. 107 But the 
Hobbesian model would allow significant constraints on 
individuals, including the imposition of slavery, due to power 
differentials. 108 Hobbes's theory of moral justification does not 
seem to line up well with our current societal understanding of 
justice. 
In contrast, Immanuel Kant develops the concept of a 
hypothetical social contract, drawing in large part from Rousseau, 
starting from a position of equality.109 He identifies the fundamental 
"contract" upon which everyone would agree-the so-called 
"categorical imperative"-to always act so as to have that action be 
universal law.110 Developing this idea in more detail, Jolm Rawls 
provides a way to implement the categorical imperative by positing 
a situation of equality where all individuals are in the "original 
position," behind a "veil of ignorance," which blinds them to their 
specific situations of religion, health, class, wealth, or talent. 111 
Rawls offers three principles that everyone would agree to in the 
"original position": the Liberty Principle (everyone has an equal 
right to extensive individual liberty); the Fair Opportunity Principle 
(if inequalities exist via positions of power or authority, those 
positions should be open to all); and the Difference Principle 
106. Will Kymlicka, The Social Contract Tradition, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 186, 
187-88 (Peter Singer ed., 1993) ("(A] hypothetical promise is no promise at all, for no-one 
has undertaken an obligation."). 
107. Id. at 188-90. In some ways this starts to so1.md like communitarian 
approaches, which allow for limitations of individual autonomy based on the need for 
constraints that are necessary to keep the society functioning. See Gutmann, supra note 
52, at 308. 
108. Kymlicka, supra note 106, at 187-88. 
109. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13-14 (Lara 
Denis ed., Broadview Press 2005) (1785); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 252-53 
(photo. reprint 2005) (1971). 
110. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 29-30 (James 
W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g 3d ed. 1993) (1785). 
111. RAWLS, supra note 109, at 136-37. 
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(inequalities should only exist to the extent they are to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged).112 
But while Rawls's theory provides a way to understand the 
distribution of property and resources within a society, he does 
not argue that anyone actually does consent to these principles-
just that they would under his theoretical original position. 
While this is a useful thought experiment to identify principles of 
a just society, even Rawls acknowledges that it is not a tool to 
determine a priori rights. 113 Rather, it functions as a standard 
against which we might determine the justness of current 
societal distributions. 114 It is difficult to show that individuals 
would hypothetically consent to any and all exercises of state 
public health power that the authorities deem appropriate. We 
could do the same thought experiment with many medical 
interventions-showing that individuals would hypothetically 
consent to their application-and yet we still require individual 
consent at the point of actual intervention.115 Here too, we might 
argue that even if the general concept of vaccination would be 
agreed upon, the individual must agree to a specific vaccine 
(although there may be consequences for refusal). So although 
the social contract based upon prior consent idea is prevalent in 
discussions of public health authority, as a theoretical basis for 
limiting informed consent it has a number of flaws. It certainly 
does not alone justify the imposition of public health measures in 
the absence of individual informed consent in all situations of 
public health needs. 
3. Contract Based on Fairness. A possible alternative to 
relying on consent as a basis for the social contract draws from 
H. L. A. Hart's theory of fairness. 116 According to Hart, the issue 
is not whether each individual has tacitly or hypothetically 
consented to be governed; rather, the issue is whether it would be 
unfair to accept the benefits of society without also accepting its 
burdens. 117 This, too, is a prevalent concept in public health 
literature. Individuals gain much from living in society, but 
112. !d. at 60-62, 65, 75, 78. 
113. !d. at 438. 
114. Id. at 12-15. 
115. See Catherine E. Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to Rot" 
Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Hous. L. REV. 447, 
452-53 (1990) (describing the informed consent requirement in medical procedures). 
116. H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 178, 190-91 
(1955). 
117. Id. at 185-86, 191. 
24 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [50:1 
society cannot function without limiting individual freedom. 118 
The social contract is based on the fairness of balancing the 
benefits to the individual from the state and the limits that are 
necessary to maintain those benefits.119 There are at least two 
problems, however, with the idea of fairness. 120 The first is that 
there may be some individuals who do not benefit from living in 
society, and they appear to not be bound under this theory. 121 The 
second problem is identified by Nozick, who takes issue with the 
whole idea that any unsolicited benefits provided by society could 
ever create enforceable obligations for the individual, based on an 
idea of fairness. 122 Although in some ways the fairness rationale 
is stronger than the consent rationale for a social contract, it is 
still hard to understand why fairness alone would justify the 
imposition of the full range of public health interventions against 
an individual's wishes. In some cases, such imposition may be 
patently unfair, no matter what societal benefits are available in 
exchange. Alternatively, one might posit a situation in which the 
individual in question has not yet obtained benefits but is still 
required to accept certain burdens-consider a potential emigre 
who has not yet been granted residency but is stopped at the 
border before entering a country and required to submit to 
various vaccinations before their case is even considered. 123 
Despite these limitations, fairness may function as a useful basis 
for understanding social contract obligations for certain groups or 
certain individuals. 
4. Summary of Social Contract Justification. While the 
social contract is most often cited for justifying state power, its 
philosophical roots are fairly complicated. Express consent 
118. See George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, 97 
ETHICS 353, 355, .358 (1987) (discussing individuals' obligations to society). 
119. See id. at 354-55, 358 (explaining the balance between individuals' benefits and 
burdens). 
120. WOLFF, supra note 93, at 60-65 (examining problems with the perceived innate 
fairness in a democratic system). 
121. See K.losko, supra note 118, at 356 ("The fact that individuals widely believe 
that they are obligated to bear burdens ... because of considerations rooted in the 
principle of faimess does not itself mean that they have these obligations."); see also 
Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 Hous. L. 
REV. 635, 665 (2000) (explaining that some individuals do not benefit from living in 
society). 
122. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 93-94 (1974). 
123. The United States has certain immunization requirements for immigrants. See, 
e.g., Notice of Reuised Vaccination Criteria for U.S. Immigration, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealthllaws-
regs/vaccination-immigrationlrevised-vaccination-criteria-immigration.html (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2012) (listing vaccination criteria for U.S. immigration). 
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certainly justifies state power, but it is almost never present. 
Tacit and hypothetical consent pose certain problems, 
although each may provide a good justificatory basis in specific 
circumstances. Surely residence alone (tacit consent) cannot 
explain why an individual must comply with all public health 
restrictions, particularly those that entail individual risk. 
Hypothetical consent may provide a better explanation; many 
people may agree in the "original position" that appropriate 
public health restrictions should be put in place limiting 
individual choice. But in some sense this just begs the 
question: what constitutes appropriate restrictions? It is not 
clear that in the original position people would simply agree to 
be governed by whatever restrictions are thought to be 
appropriate by the relevant public health authorities; perhaps 
they would only agree to certain types of restrictions. Nor does 
fairness solve the problem, since for some the fairness of the 
benefits justifying the "contract" may be in question. Thus, 
Hart's fairness theory may justify obligations for some people, 
but not others, and probably does not create a binding social 
contract justifying all public health interventions. As 
appealing as a social contract justification may be on the 
surface, it does not seem to function as a basis for overriding 
individual choice in the full range of public health 
interventions. A. John Simmons concludes that there must be 
grounds other than consent theory for justifying overall state 
power, 124 let alone for limiting informed consent. This does not 
mean that social contract theory does not have a role to play in 
understanding state public health power; it merely means that if 
the goal is to develop a framework to analyze the scope of state 
public health power in the absence of individual informed 
consent, we must seek guidance from other philosophical 
theories. 
B. Utilitarianism 
Perhaps the problem is with the idea of a "contract" in the 
first place; a stronger argument in favor of state public health 
intervention, even without individual informed consent, may be a 
utilitarian one. As the Jacobson court acknowledged, the 
Massachusetts "state legislature proceeded upon the theory 
which recognized vaccination as at least an effective if not the 
124. See A. John Simmons, Political Obligations and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF 
CONSENT 305, 325 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (discussing 
objections to consent theory). 
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best known way in which to meet and suppress the evils of a 
smallpox epidemic that imperiled an entire population."125 In 
other words, despite its flaws, a system of vaccination provides 
better overall benefit to the community than a system risking a 
smallpox epidemic. The court also noted the very small risk to 
individuals (and the possibility that an individual with a real 
medical risk could opt out). 126 
Utilitarianism offers an additional theory of state public 
health power. Moreover, it enables us to weigh the level of threat 
(or potential harm) to the community against the level of 
potential harm to the individual. 127 Jeremy Bentham argues that 
individuals have a duty to obey the state when it is in the group's 
interest (or when it maximizes the common good-to put it in 
standard utilitarian terms). 128 Of course there are many 
difficulties with utilitarian theories. Not only is it often difficult 
to identify the specific course of action that maximizes overall 
utility, 129 but utilitarian reasoning naturally favors the will of the 
maioritv. even when it entails e:reat detriment to a minoritv. as 
long a~ . the overall utility is~ increased. 130 On its face, v this 
approach seerns to allow state persecution of minorities in favor 
of the common good. vVhile potentially attractive in some public 
health contexts, a theory that potentially would allow, for 
example, the killing of small number of infected individuals to 
125. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905). 
126. I d. at 24, 39. 
127. See JOHN STUART MILL, UI'lLI'I'ARIANISiVI 16-17 (George Sher ed., 1979) (defining 
utilitarianism principles, which require individuals to "sacrific[e] their own greatest good 
for the good of others"). 
128. WOLFF, supra note 93, at 50-51. Consequentialist theories, such as 
utilitarianism, determine the ethical or correct course of action by looking at the 
consequences of different alternatives. The alternative that leads to the best result, 
however defined (e.g., most happiness, greatest good, etc.), is the correct one. See David 0. 
Brink, Some Forms & Limits of' Consequentialism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL 
THEORY, supra note 52, at 381-84. In contrast, natural rights theory-or Kantian 
theory-is not consequence driven, but deontological. Robert M. Veatch, Revisiting A 
Theory of Medical Ethics: Main Themes and Anticipated Changes, in THE STORY OF 
BIOETHICS 67, 81 (Jennifer K. Walter & Eran P. Klein eds., 2003) Deontological theories 
evaluate alternative courses of action based on the importance of particular values, 
without regard to the consequences of promoting those values. See David MeN a ugh ton & 
Piers Rawling, Deontology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY, supra note 
52, at 424-26. 
129. See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in SMART & WILLIAlVIS, 
supra note 35, at 86-87 ("(I]t is perfectly possible for an agent to be ignorant or 
mistaken ... about what is the right action in the circmnstances."). One can apply 
utilitarian reasoning without adopting utilitarian theory-i.e., applying a 
consequentialist analysis focused on something other than maximal utility-which might 
avoid some of the pitfalls with utility calculations. 
130. See id. at 105 ("(E]ven if the removal would be unpleasant for the minority, a 
utilitarian calculation might well end up favouring this step .... "). 
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protect the community as a whole-as is done with animal herds 
to avoid the spread of disease131-should make us wary. On the 
other hand, utilitarian theory does not rely on express, tacit, or 
hypothetical consent and thus provides an independent basis for 
understanding the scope of state power and individual 
obligations.132 Furthermore, utilitarian theory is already a part of 
legal reasoning in public health cases, although it may not 
always be labeled as such.133 Thus, the theory may seem 
comfortably familiar, even when applied to new cases. More 
importantly, because utilitarian theory is already used as a 
justification for limiting individual informed consent in a public 
health context, we should recognize this more clearly and be alert 
to its flaws (such as the difficulty making utility comparisons). In 
those cases where the flaws are prevalent, the justification for 
limiting informed consent is weakened. 
We can draw from the work of John Stuart Mill in applying 
utilitarian theory to understand the appropriate scope of state 
public health interventions. 134 In On Liberty, Mill suggests a way 
to limit state powers under a utilitarian framework using the 
principle of liberty.135 He states, famously, that "the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant."136 This is commonly known as the ''harm principle."137 
Individuals should be left to their own devices within the private 
sphere because they are more likely to know what will increase 
their utility than others (even if they make mistakes) and 
because liberty is necessary for the full development of human 
131. See 9 C.F.R § 71.14 (2012) (noting that compensation can be made "[w]hen, in 
order to prevent the spread of any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease, it 
becomes necessary to slaughter any diseased or exposed animals ... "). 
132. Cf MILL, supra note 127, at 6-26 (defining utilitarianism and discussing 
utilitarian principles without mentioning consent principles). 
133. See Robert I. Field & Arthur L. Caplan, A Proposed Ethical Framework for 
Vaccine Mandates: Competing Values and the Case of HPV, 18 KENNEDY lNST. ETHICS J. 
111, 114-15 (2008) (discussing utilitarianism in the public health context). 
134. See generally MILL, supra note 127, at 7 (introducing utilitarian principles as 
those that promote happiness). 
135. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 16-17 (Alan 
Ryan ed., Penguin Books 2006) (1859); see also ANDREW LEVINE, ENGAGING POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS 143-48 (2002) (discussing Mill's application of 
utilitarianism to the principle of liberty). 
136. MILL, su.pra note 135, at 16. Of course we often debate the validity of state and 
federal laws which appear to be focused on protecting an individual from harming 
himself. Some of these may be justified via a social contract analysis, others may be 
invalid exercises of state power. 
137. DAVID INGRAM, LAW: lillY CONCEPTS IN PHILOSOPHY 134 (2006). 
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beings (and thus the society is better off overall if people are left 
to make their own choices). 138 In fact, these two ideas mirror 
nicely the oft-cited reasons for requiring individual informed 
consent-that individuals are better able to determine which 
medical treatments are in their interests, and that promoting 
individual choice benefits society by encouraging individual 
autonomy. 139 State limits on individual liberty are warranted, 
then, on two grounds. First, intervention is permitted for those 
individuals who lack the capacity to determine their own good, 
such as children or incompetent adults. 140 Second, intervention is 
permitted in the public sphere on utilitarian grounds-i.e., to 
prevent harm to others. Correspondingly, individual informed 
consent may not be required in situations where the individual in 
question is incompetent, or the intervention is necessary to 
prevent harm to others. It is important to stress, however, that 
the assertion that state force is not warranted on paternalistic 
grounds does not mean that we must stand aside and let 
individuals make what are perceived as poor choices. To the 
contrary, society may take a variety of measures to encourage 
choices that it perceives to be in the interests of its members. 
Thus, we may have a third category in which intervention is 
permissible on paternalistic grounds, as long as it does not, in the 
end, remove the individual's ability to choose. 141 That is, society 
may structure decisions in such a way as to encourage the 
.!' d h . 142 pre1erre c mce. 
138. This is a form of rule-utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarianism seeks to effectuate 
rules that will generally result in the greatest good. Act-utilitarianism, on the other hand, 
focuses on individual acts and in each case evaluates what action will lead to the greatest 
good. These are also sometimes described as direct (act) and indirect (rule) utilitarianism. 
See David 0. Brink, Mill's Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1671 (2010). 
139. See supra Part LA 
140. See Field & Caplan, supra note 133, at 111, 114, 118-19 (discussing the 
"categories of individuals," including children and disabled adults, who have often been 
subject to interventions). 
141. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4-6 (2008) (discussing "libertarian 
paternalism," which argues for "self-conscious efforts ... to steer people's choices in 
directions that will improve their lives," while "maintain[ing] or increas[ing] freedom of 
choice."). 
142. One very interesting approach in this context is the idea of "nudges" described 
by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their book. Id. at 3-6. See also the articles and 
commentary discussing the ethics of nudges in volume 12, issue 2, of the American 
Journal of Bioethics (Special Issue) (February 2012). Creating incentives to influence 
choice may be permissible even with respect to fundamental interests of bodily integrity. 
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (finding that a state may, through differential 
funding, make "childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's 
decision" to have an abortion). 
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To implement this theory, one needs a basis for 
distinguishing the public sphere (where intervention is allowed) 
from the private sphere (where it is not). This could be where a 
theory of natural rights comes into play-states may not 
interfere with the .inherent rights of human beings. 143 If you 
accept that natural rights exist, this limitation may solve many 
problems. But the mere assertion of natural rights may not 
convince everyone of their existence, and it certainly does not 
suffice to determine what rights fall into this "natural" 
category. 144 In response, Jonathan Wolff argues we can draw from 
the concept of utility to delineate the public from the private 
sphere. 145 Those laws that promote general utility are within the 
public sphere and those that do not are within the private 
sphere. 146 Of course this may seem like circular reasoning. But 
the idea is that rather than try to distinguish public from private 
on other grounds (say by determining the inherent or natural 
rights of individuals), we should just ask whether the 
intervention in question promotes general utility. While debates 
remain about the integration of the liberty principle and 
utilitarian theory, these are beyond the scope of this Article. For 
our purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that this approach 
allows us to understand the scope of state powers in the public 
health context without relying on the limited notion of a social 
contract based either on fairness or consent. 
C. Application of Justifications to Contagious Disease 
Interventions 
In summary, for a utilitarian rationale to justify vaccination 
in the absence of informed consent, there must be some showing 
that the common good is indeed increased more than the 
aggregate of individual harms which may occur by allowing 
vaccination without consent. For this latter evaluation, there is 
both the harm of intervening without consent (a harm to 
autonomy, or a dignitary harm) and the potential physical harms 
from the vaccination. 147 Unless the disease in question is a 
143. WOLFF, supra note 93, at 114-15. 
144. See id. at 115-16 (discussing the difficulties of defending a "theory of natural 
rights" and the difficulties of determining "what natural rights we have"). Consider the 
ongoing debate in this country about whether the right to basic health care services is a 
"natural right" of human beings. 
145. Id. at 116-20. 
146. See id. (describing "the line between the private and public spheres"). 
147. See Michelle M. Mello, Rationalizing Vaccine Injury Compensation, 22 
BIOETHICS 32, 37 (2008) ("But, arguably, the burdens associated with vaccination 
requirements are special: they go beyond dignitary harms and economic losses to actual 
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serious threat to the community and unless the vaccine's safety 
and efficacy is well established, it may be difficult to justify 
jettisoning informed consent requirements. Moreover, even in 
those cases where this can be shown, allowing individual 
informed consent may still result in more overall utility than a 
mandatory system. This may be because the vast majority of 
people will accede to a voluntary system, and such a system will 
avoid the harm to individual autonomy. In fact, most vaccination 
efforts are voluntary, and almost all involve an opt-out for health 
(and sometimes other) reasons. 148 Even for those that are not 
voluntary, there is little basis for allowing an exception to the 
information disclosure requirement because the provision of 
information will allow individuals to determine the actual risks 
to themselves and may result in better overall compliance. Only 
the individual consent requirement may be excused, and that 
l . . t 149 on y 1n rare c1rcums ances. -
Quarantine and isolation raise similar issues. But unlike 
vaccination, there can be little direct therapeutic benefit to 
complying. (An individual who has been vaccinated, on the other 
hand, may well obtain additional immunity and thus direct 
therapeutic benefit.)150 In fact, there may be considerable risk for 
those who are not infected but are quarantined with those who 
are. This is one reason why there is increasing interest in using 
techniques such as "quarantine in place," in which individuals 
observe distancing measures within their own homes. 151 For any 
one individual, the choice to remain separated from others may 
not increase individual utility, but the separation of exposed or 
diseased individuals from the group benefits society as a whole. 152 
physical injury .... "). 
148. Even school vaccination requirements allow parental opt-outs based upon 
health, religious, or sometimes philosophical objections. See School and Childcare 
Vaccination Surveys, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www2a.cdc.gov/nip/schoolsurv/schimmRqmt.asp (last updated July 21, 2011) 
(providing a state-by-state list of permitted vaccination exemptions). 
149. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-
Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 712-13 (2003) (In the context of the rabies vaccine, 
which has severe side effects, "[c]onsiderations of fairness and justice control only when 
individual consent is impossible to obtain"). 
150. There may be indirect benefits for the individual who avoids infecting friends or 
family members. Such benefits may encourage voluntary quarantines. 
151. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Quarantine: Voluntary or Not?, 32 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 83, 84 (2004) ("Reframing the stigmatizing term 
'quarantine' along the lines of a 'snow day' or 'shelter in place' principles may aid in 
acceptance. A snow day is simply a request to limit interpersonal contacts ... by asking 
citizens to stay home for a specified period of time."). 
152. GOSTIN, supra note 45, at 12; see Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of 
Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1735, 1741 (1988) (noting that quarantine laws are tolerated 
.) 
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Perhaps individuals, not knowing exposure, would agree, 
hypothetically, to such constraints ahead of time. In other cases, 
the scope of the quarantined area may be large enough that the 
intervention is considered more akin to an environmental one 
than one of individual application. In still other cases, a 
utilitarian rationale justifies the quarantine, as the potential 
harm to the individual is outweighed by the benefits to the 
society as a whole. Under this rationale, quarantine and isolation 
should be used only rarely, when the benefits clearly outweigh 
the burdens. As with vaccination, utilitarian reasoning would 
require that if voluntary restrictions are more likely to achieve 
the sought-after results than mandatory restrictions, the former 
should be used.153 
The classic public-health-interventions-to-combat-infectious-
disease category provides an example in which autonomy does 
play a role. But this is also a situation in which exceptions may 
function based on a variety of theoretical justifications. Each 
justification may apply differently to different groups, such as 
health care workers versus the general public, resulting in 
diverse applications of informed consent requirements. But no 
theory justifies the avoidance of information disclosure 
requirements. Even the extremely controversial mandatory 
anthrax vaccination of armed forces personnel during the Gulf 
War was supposed to include distribution of information 
pamphlets at the time of intervention. (Unfortunately, these 
were sometimes not available and other times not provided-/54 It 
is worth recognizing that the traditional emergency exception to 
informed consent may also play a role in this context, possibly 
limiting expansive disclosure. But most situations calling for 
vaccination are not so time-sensitive as to prevent information 
disclosure. 155 Paradoxically, the "emergency" necessitating 
quarantine or isolation is not directed at the individual whose 
because they are of positive utility, that is, "quarantines enhance the general welfare"). 
153. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Your Liberty or Your Life: Talking Point on Public 
Health Versus Civil Liberties, 8 EMBO REP. 1093, 1096-97 (2007) (comparing the 
effectiveness of mandatory versus voluntary quarantine). 
154. Bernard Rostker, Information Paper: Vaccine Use During the Gulf War, 
GULFLINK, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/va/ (updated Dec. 7, 2000); see also MILITARY 
VACCINE AGENCY, DEP'T OF DEF., ANTHRAX VACCINE IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM 
INFORMATION (Dec. 19, 2005), http://wwv:.vaccines.mil/documents/864Dec2005house-
inhouse-out.pdf (providing information on the Department of Defense's Anthrax Vaccine 
Immunization Program as of 2005). 
155. See Recommended Immunizations for Adults, CENTERS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION (last updated May 31, 2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/ 
schedules/downloads/adult/adult-schedule-easy-read. pdf (recommending immunizations 
windows that extend to four years or even longer). 
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liberty is restrained, but involves the risk of exposure of others. 
This is a fundamentally different situation than the typical 
emergency exception which justifies avoidance of requirements 
based on the promotion of the individual's own autonomy, which 
may be lost (through extensive harm to health or life) by 
insisting on fully informed consent in an emergency.156 
So although there is a public health exception to informed 
consent for classic contagious disease interventions, the 
exception only excuses the consent requirement (if even that), not 
the information disclosure obligations. The focus of those 
disclosures, however, may well be different than the traditional 
informed consent context. Professor Wendy Parmet suggests that 
we shift the scope of disclosure away from individual risks and 
benefits and towards the public health risks and benefits of any 
particular intervention. 157 For example, disclosure in the vaccine 
context would include the public benefit of vaccines and the 
harms of failing to achieve herd immunity. 158 Moreover, the 
obligation to disclose information would shift from the private 
clinical encounter to a public setting, and also from a professional 
liability model to a public accountability model for inadequate or 
unpublicized warnings. 159 Thus, informed consent for public 
health interventions may look substantially different than 
informed consent for individual medical treatment interventions. 
IV. PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATION REPORTING Al'W USE 
Perhaps even more interesting than the traditional public 
health examples discussed thus far is the growing use of personal 
medical information for public health purposes. 160 The most 
156. Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.lVI. L. 
REV. 39, 70-71 (2007) (discussing "preservation of life or the prevention of serious bodily 
harm to the patient" as the primary justification for the traditional emergency exception 
to informed consent); Jolm A. Gleason, Quarantine: An Unreasonable Solution to the 
AIDS Dilemma, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 217, 234 (1986) ("It must be realized that quarantines 
are instituted in order to benefit the public, not the individual."). 
157. WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 198-203 
(2009). 
158. See Wendy E. Parmet, Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They 
Compatible when it Comes to Vaccines?, 8 J. HEALTH CAREL. & POL'Y 71, 107-10 (2005) 
(advocating for disclosing the public benefits and harms of vaccinations as opposed to just 
the individual benefits and harms). 
159. Id. 
160. There is also the use of personal health information for research purposes. 
While I acknowledge that the line between public health practice and research is not 
always clear, discussion of the limitations of informed consent for public health research 
is a topic for another article. 
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common use is contagious disease reporting.161 In addition to 
disease reporting, there are also efforts to gather information to 
determine population disease burden, or even to target 
interventions to persons at risk. Consider one New York City 
Health Department program that sends letters to diabetes 
patients who have glycemic control issues, like a high AlC test 
level, or who are overdue for a test. 162 Although the actual testing 
is done with patient consent, the monitoring and notification 
letters are sent whether or not the patient has consented to the 
intervention.163 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the information in 
question should be within the control of the individual,164 why 
and when is it permissible to use such information without 
consent? The usual justifications for requiring informed consent 
to treatment do not necessarily apply to sharing of information. 
That is not to say that consent may be avoided in all situations, 
just that the reasons for requiring consent here are not the same 
as the reasons for requiring consent to treatment. Confidentiality 
of medical information serves two primary purposes-it 
recognizes individuals' rights to control their identity and it 
encourages the free sharing of information with medical 
professionals.165 The first rationale is rights-based and the second 
utilitarian: better health outcomes will be achieved if individuals 
share information with medical professionals, and the 
assumption is that they will not do that unless the information is 
kept confidential. But health outcomes may be better overall if 
some information (i.e., that related to contagious diseases) is 
shared in a limited way. Additionally, there is no evidence that 
mandated disclosure of some personal information (even 
identifiable information) results in patients being less willing to 
161. See Terence L. Chorba et a!., Mandatory Reporting of Infectious Diseases by 
Clinicians, 262 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 3018, 3018-19 (1989) (noting that all states have some 
form of mandatory communicable disease reporting). 
162. N.Y.C. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, THE NEW YORK CITY A1C REGISTRY: 
SUPPORTING PROVIDERS & PATIENTS IN DIABETES CARE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dohl 
downloads/pdf/diabetes/diabetes-a1c-reg-serv.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
163. See N.Y.C. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, NEW YORK CITY A1C REGISTRY: 
IMPROVING DIABETES CARE IN NEW YORK CITY 25 (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdfldiabetes/diabetes-a1c-reg.pdf (explaining that 
patients are automatically enrolled in the registry and must specifically opt-out of the 
A1C registry if they do not wish to be contacted). 
164. In other words, assuming the information in question is, in fact, the individual's 
information as opposed to information regarding a family or group. See, e.g., Jessica Berg, 
Grave Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality, 34 CONN. L. 
REV. 81, 90-95 (2001) (discussing control over an individual's confidential information 
after his or her death). 
165. PARMET, supra note 157, at 82-84, 97-98. 
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share information with health care professionals. 166 Debates 
about this lack of empirical evidence have come up in other 
contexts, such as the effect of mandatory reporting laws on 
individuals' willingness to seek medical care. 167 
Even if the doctrine of informed consent applies to the use of 
individual medical information generally, various theoretical 
rationales may justifY an exception for sharing some information. 
First, sharing information without individual identifiers raises few, 
if any, autonomy issues, bringing up questions about the 
justification for applying the doctrine in the first place. 168 The notion 
that individuals should have absolute rights to control information 
they generate is belied by the consistent narrowing of private 
space.169 While control over identifiable information may have 
implications for individual identity (and thus for autonomy), control 
over de-identified information is less easily justified using an 
autonomy model. 170 At the very least, even if there are autonomy 
interests in controlling de-identified information, these interests 
should be balanced against other principles and other rights. 
Consider, for example, the use of infonnation to detennine 
population level disease burden, such as state-mandated cancer 
registries. In most cases the reporting is anonymous-the 
information is shared, but stripped of identifYing characteristics. 
Here there is no rights-based justification for individual control over 
identity because the information is not linked to identity. Moreover, 
because the issue is anonymous information sharing, not individual 
intervention, the other autonomy-based rationales do not apply.171 
Yet infonning the individual about the disclosure remains 
166. Berg, supra note 164, at 107. 
167. See, e.g., Nichole Miras Mordini, A1andatoTy State Interventions for Domestic 
Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects of Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. 
REV. 295, 326 (2004) (describing the policy arguments used in support of and in opposition 
to mandatory reporting statutes). A large number of states have mandatory reporting for 
gunshot wounds. For a list of statutes, see Family Violence Statutes, AM. ACAD. 
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, http://www.aaos.org/about/abuse/ststatut.asp (last visited Sept. 
7, 2012). 
168. There is a vast amount of literature discussing identifiability of information, 
and I will not go into detail here. 
169. See Jonathon W. Penney, Privacy and the New Virtualism, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
194, 205-10 (2008) (discussing the challenges to "informational privacy'' in the digital 
age). 
170. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 
519-21 (1995) (discussing a spectrum of the identifiability of information and the 
corresponding protections the information should receive, with anonymous information 
receiving the least protection). 
171. Id. at 520 (recognizing that "patients have a weaker claim to control the use of 
nonidentifiable data because they are less likely to suffer personal harm by the 
disclosure"). 
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important. It allows individuals to prepare for a possible breach of 
confidentiality, and may enable them to take steps to minimize the 
harmful impact. 
Second, even if identifiable information is shared, and thus 
autonomy clearly an issue, one of the rationales allowing an 
exception to informed consent requirements may apply. Sharing 
identifiable personal medical information raises autonomy 
issues, but not in exactly the same way as mandatory medical 
interventions because bodily integrity is not at issue. Consider 
contagious disease reporting. All states have mandatory 
reporting statutes for various diseases.172 Contagious disease 
reporting generally is not anonymous. 173 The practice of contact 
tracing requires individually identifiable information to be 
shared with public health authorities so other exposed 
individuals can be notified. 174 This does not mean that the initial 
infected individual has to be identified to the contacts, but the 
public health authority has access to identifiable information. As 
a practical matter, patients may be asked to provide informed 
consent before disclosure, but such authorization is not always 
required.175 Social contract and fairness rationales may function 
to allow some information sharing. We currently live in a society 
that requires a great deal of information sharing to function 
well. 176 Moreover, a general rule allowing the sharing of such 
information may result in more overall utility than a rule 
allowing it to remain confidential; this is often the cited basis for 
confidentiality exceptions. 177 
The information sharing context is one in which the initial 
autonomy rationale does not function in the same way as it 
might when bodily integrity is at issue, and also one in which 
various theoretical justifications may function to allow an 
172. Chorba et aL, supra note 161, at 3018. 
173. See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., The Role of State Law in Protecting Human Subjects 
of Public Health Research and Practice, J.L. MED. & ETIDCS 654 (2003) (noting that many 
states do not require informed consent "for the release of identifiable information for 
public health purposes"). 
174. Nancy E. Kass & Andrea Carlson Gielen, The Ethics of Contact Tracing 
Programs and Their Implications for Women, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 89, 90-91 
(1998). 
175. Burris et al., supra note 173, at 656. 
176. See Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in the Federal Bankruptcy 
Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1011, 1024-25 (2000) ("[S]ociety needs 
information to function; therefore, any action which chills the willingness of persons to 
provide information hurts society."). 
177. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings 
Under California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 314-15 (1996) (discussing 
several utilitarian rationales for and benefits of information disclosure). 
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exception. Even if informed consent is applied in the 
traditional sense, it may not function to provide adequate 
protections from harm. Gathering public health information is 
crucial-what alternatives to the informed consent model 
might be used? One interesting approach may be to apply a 
framework analogous to the "fair use" exception in copyright 
law. 178 The doctrine allows third parties to use an individual's 
intellectual property in a reasonable manner, even in the 
absence of consent. 179 Thus, even if individual medical 
information is viewed as the property of the individual (and 
this is still a point to be determined)/80 there could be various 
uses of the information allowed without individual informed 
consent. Some of the debates about the copyright fair use 
exception have taken issue with the idea that it can be 
"predicated on the implied or tacit consent of the author," 
noting that such consent is fictional at best. 181 Similar to the 
debates discussed earlier about tacit consent, an alternative 
rationale for justifying fair use, such as utilitarianism, may 
need to be explored. 
Despite these barriers, developing a doctrine of 
information "fair use" may be a valuable mechanism that could 
be applied to allow the public health use of information 
without individual informed consent. The copyright fair use 
exception is delineated in § 107 of Title 17 of the U.S. Code. 182 
There are four factors to consider: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work [purely factual versus creative 
work]; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
170. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW§§ 10.01-.05, at 
487-89 (5th ed. 2010) (describing the "fair use" doctrine). The application of the exception 
rests on four factors: noncommercial use, factual versus creative copyrighted work, 
amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect on the potential market for 
the protected work. Id. § 10.06, at 493-94; see also Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (discussing the distinctions between creative and factual work in the fair use 
context). These factors could be adapted to medical information use. 
179. LEAFFER, Sttpra note 178, § 10.02, at 487-88. 
180. The well-known Moore v. Regents ofthe University of California case involved a 
question of a research use of information. 793 P.2d 479, 480-82 (Cal. 1990). Although the 
court rejected the idea of a property right in information, it did state that informed 
consent was required. Id. at 484--85, 487-89, 492-93. 
181. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 13.05, at 13-
157 (2012). 
182. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 183 
37 
What would a public health fair use exception for 
individual health information look like? First, consider how 
the information is being used and by whom. Information used 
for public health purposes, particularly if gathered by 
government entities, such as public health departments (or 
upon direct authorization from a public health department), 
would be more likely to fall into the exception than, say, 
information gathered by health care institutions or pharmacies 
for marketing purposes. 184 Second, information "created" by the 
individual-for example, notes about patient feelings or 
patient statements-may be given more protection than more 
purely "factual" information about medical status, such as 
contagious disease diagnosis .185 Third, the scope of use is 
relevant; information disclosed should not include the entirety 
of the individual's medical record. Only that information 
necessary to achieve the public health goal in question should 
be shared. The fourth factor takes into account the potential 
market for the information. There is a growing interest in the 
potential value of personal data, and recent efforts (such as the 
Facebook IP0)186 reflect the possibility that a clear market will 
emerge in this context. While there are already markets for 
third party aggregations of data, there is little financial gain 
to be had by individuals choosing to share their own 
information. 187 Changes in this area may result in limitations 
on fair use. 
In addition to efforts to scope out the full contours of a fair 
use analog, future scholarly efforts should continue to 
scrutinize the role of autonomy, rather than just assume its 
application, and consider whether individual informed consent 
should (or even could) play a protective role in various 
settings. Work must also be done to develop better disclosure 
mechanisms and more secure information safeguards rather 
183. ld.; see also Fair Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html (last updated June 2012). 
184. See Harper & Roe Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985) (noting 
that commercial as opposed to nonprofit use is a "factor tending to weigh against a finding 
of fair use"). 
185. Mental health information may be given more protection under this conception. 
186. Somini Sengupta & Evelyn M. Rusli, Personal Data's Value? Facebook Set to 
Find Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at A1. 
187. See ,Joshua Brustein, Start-Ups Seeh to Help Users Put a Price on Their 
Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at B3 (discussing the value of personal data, 
and opining that "individually, [personal] bits of data are worth practically nothing"). 
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than relying on individual authorization as a means to protect 
individual interests. Moreover, while consent may not always 
be required for the sharing of public health information, as 
with the other exceptions, disclosure obligations still exist. 
Parmet's suggestions may be applicable here, too, indicating 
the need to shift the focus from the individual to the public 
• 188 
settmg. 
Finally, the scope of permissible use of individual medical 
information in the research context must be examined. The 
growing trend in medical research is to use observational 
studies, drawing on existing data in medical records.189 The 
line between such efforts and public health surveillance and 
monitoring is less clear than the line between traditional 
clinical trials and public health. 190 There is a type of fair use 
exception in patent law, allowing the use of patented 
inventions without prior licensing for experimental purposes. 191 
Like the scope of copyright fair use, the scope of the 
experimental use exception is subject to debate. Both, 
however, seem to be premised on the idea that even protected 
intellectual property can be used without permission or 
compensation, provided the use is not directly commercial. 192 
Although this Article does not directly address research uses of 
information, it may be that an experimental use exemption 
provides a valuable framework for understanding the limits of 
individual informed consent for research involving medical 
information. 
188. Parmet, supra note 158, at 107-10. 
189. SeeP. Jepsen et al., Interpretation of Obseruational Studies, 90 HEART 956, 956, 
960 (2004) (noting that observational studies are frequently the only feasible way to 
research modern medical questions). There are other research studies for which requiring 
individual informed consent will also cause problems. See, e.g., Julius Sim & Angus 
Dawson, Informed Consent and Cluster-Randomized Trials, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 480, 
481-82 (2012) (discussing incompatibility of informed consent with some cluster-
randomized trials). 
190. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Priuacy, Autonomy, 
and Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 97-104, 
109 (2012) (comparing clinical and observational research, discussing the benefits and 
risks of observational research, and discussing whether informed consent should be 
obtained in observational research). 
191. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 315-16 (2003). There is both a common-law experimental 
use exception and a statutory exception. 35 U.S.C. § 27l(e)(1) (2011); Madey v. Duke 
Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
192. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (making commercial versus educational use a 
primary factor in evaluating fair use); Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (strictly defining patent 
experimental use defense to exclude any activity that has commercial implications). 
r 
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V. CONCLUSION 
There is no single theory that explains the scope (and 
limits) of state public health powers and the corresponding 
obligations of individuals to submit to state authority in a 
public health context. There are multiple bases for justifying 
state power to intervene without individuq.l consent, and each 
has slightly different implications. As a result, there are 
varying degrees to which individual informed consent 
requirements apply in public health contexts. Some 
individuals may have expressly consented to certain 
limitations; others may be bound by fairness. 193 It is worth 
pointing out, however, that even if some people can claim that 
they are exempt from direct obligation to society to accept 
public health interventions, that does not mean they are free 
to do anything. The absence of political obligations (say to the 
state or community in general) does not presuppose the 
absence of moral obligations (such as the obligation not to 
harm others). 194 We may well have moral obligations to our 
communities to accept certain public health interventions such 
as quarantine, isolation, or vaccination. But this is further 
than we need go in delving into political theory. For purposes 
of this Article, we need only consider the role the justifications 
play in understanding the contours of a public health 
exception to informed consent. 
While the prior discussion does not identify one single 
justification for allowing a public health exception to individual 
informed consent, it does provide some clear guidance in this 
area. First, no rationale examined appears to justify the 
avoidance of disclosure obligations, except when the traditional 
emergency or waiver exceptions apply. That is, while some public 
health interventions may be allowed without individual 
authorization, in all cases information should be shared either 
directly with the individual or through general public 
notification. Second, the framework governing information 
disclosure may need to shift from an individual model to a public 
health model. This may necessitate changes both in the content 
of the disclosures (e.g., inclusion of public health risks and 
benefits) and the location of the disclosures (e.g., moving from the 
individual clinical setting to the community level). Third, the use 
193. See WOLFF, supra note 93, at 55-56 (discussing the principle of fairness in the 
context of consent). 
194. Id. at 37-38 (discussing how political and moral obligations operate 
independently). 
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of a particular rationale to justify an intervention may only work 
in certain contexts, and it is worth taking the time to evaluate 
each fully. A social contract model may be applicable to certain 
groups (e.g., health care professionals), but not to others (e.g., the 
general public). Moreover, application of a rationale that initially 
appears to permit an exception, such as maximizing overall 
health, may, in fact, weigh in favor of individual consent when 
the use of a consent model will increase participation and thus 
overall health. 195 Fourth, where an exception to informed consent 
does come into play, effort should be made to consider what other 
protections may need to be implemented. Community 
consultation should play a larger role than it currently does in 
designing, implementing, and evaluating public health 
interventions. Finally, although autonomy remains a valued 
principle in our society and the doctrine of informed consent 
serves to protect and promote autonomy, development of 
alternative frameworks, such as "fair use" of personal health 
information, will be crucial to maintain an appropriate balance 
between public health needs and individual rights. 
195. The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services recently convened a 
working group to study which policies, including mandatory requirements for influenza 
vaccination of health care workers, will best achieve target vaccination rates. 
HHS Action Plan to Prevent Healthcare·Associated Infections: Influenza Vaccination of 
Healthcare Personnel, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & Hli!vL SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ 
ash/initiatives/hailtier2_flu.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
